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-  Institutions are pivotal in shaping fishermen incentives 
- e.g. catch shares and bycatch avoidance
-  However, the ability to avoid bycatch depends on 
technological, biological, and physical aspects of the 
fishery as well 
- e.g. “production possibilities” or “targeting ability”
Motivation
1. Was a new incentive structure (Amendment 80) 
successful in increasing bycatch avoidance and reducing 
bycatch rates? 
2. Can institutions mask hidden flexibilities and substitution 
capabilities of fishermen?
Two Questions
Chapter 5. The Fishery Production Function: Implications for Fishery Policy Analysis 75
hyperbolic distance function has been applied in a fisheries setting to explicitly account
for the nature of bycatch or bad output production. Third, pre- and post-rationalization
data allow me to investigate the extent to which previous inferences on targeting ability in
non-rights-based fisheries reflect actual technological relationships or are merely the product
of the poor incentives for substitution provided without the security of harvesting rights.
These findings will be useful in guiding a priori assessment of the impacts of rights-based
management systems on the composition of multi-species catch and production.
5.1 The BSAI Groundfish Fishery
The BSAI non-pollock groundfish trawl fishery is a relatively small fleet of catcher processors
that ply the waters of the Eastern Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands (Figure 5.1), using
bottom trawl gear to catch a variety of groundfish species.1 Vessels embark on trips of 2-4
weeks in length, processing harvested fish onboard. Processing is typically minimal, often
involving heading and gutting the fish, freezing them, and ultimately delivering them to
brokers or wholesalers for direct sale or further processing. Since the early 2000s, twenty-
three vessels have actively participated in the fishery, ranging in size from 91 to 295 feet
(median=154) with horsepower ranging from 850 to 7000 (median=2250).
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Figure 5.1: Map of Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands -
Generally speaking, the BSAI groundfish fishery can be divided into two fisheries: the
1“Groundfish” refers to any fish species that live on or near the bottom of the seafloor.
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
The BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery
The BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery
Multispecies fishery
- Prohibited Species: 
• Pacific Halibut 
• King Crab 
• Tanner Crab 
- Primary “Target” Species: 
• Rock sole 
• Yellowfin sole 
• Flathead sole 
• Pacific cod 
• Atka mackerel 
• Pacific ocean perch
The BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery
- Catcher Processor Trawlers 
• Primarily head and gut 
• 23 CPs since 2000 
• range from 91 to 295 ft





















Total Groundfish Harvest in the Amendment 80 BSAI Fishery



























- Goals and Objectives 
• Increase target catch and profits 
• Reduce bycatch and discards 
• Increase flexibility while complying with target and 
prohibited species TACS
- Adopted by NPFMC in 2006 and implemented in 2008
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 
groundfish fisheries in the BSAI are 
managed under the FMP. The North 
vessels; (2) allocating fishery resources 
among BSAI trawl harvesters in 
consideration of historic and present 
harvest patterns and future harvest 
needs; (3) establishing a LAPP for the 
non-AFA trawl catcher/processors and 
authorizing the allocation of groundfish 
species to harvesting cooperatives to 
encourage fishing practices with lower 
discard rates and to improve the 
opportunity for increasing the value of 
harvested species while lowering costs; 
and (4) limiting the ability of non-AFA 
trawl catcher/processors to expand their 
harvesting capacity into other fisheries 
not managed under a LAPP. 
I. Development of the Program 
A. History of Bycatch and Discard 
Reduction Efforts in the BSAI 
The Council has long recognized the 
• Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008): 
- Target species TACs allocated as fleet-wide common pool 
over multiple “sub-seasons” 
- e.g. Rock sole A, B, and C seasons, each with their own TAC
The BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery
- TAC for prohibited species 
allocated to each target species 
fisheries  
- e.g. Halibut allocated to each rock 
sole sub-season 
- Target fishery closed if either 
prohibited species or target 
species TAC reached. 
!
- Target fisheries typically closed due 
to binding bycatch TAC 
- Halibut was the primary “choke” 
species
























3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48



























































Atka Western AI 
fishery closed 
(Oct 6)
Atka Central AI 
fishery closed 
(Oct 6)
Figure 5.2: Weekly production and closures - Weekly production and fishery closures
for the BSAI groundfish fisheries in 2006. Data is from the weekly production reports.8
mented to the BSAI Fishery Management Plan. The provisions of A80 were designed to
facilitate increased target catch and profits, reduced bycatch and discards, and increased
flexibility while complying with target and prohibited species TACs. Implementation of A80
made a number of changes to the state of fishery regulations at the time. First, A80 e↵ec-
tively limited future entry into the fishery and granted a defined share of the total A80 TAC
for the six target species (yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel,
and Pacific Ocean perch) to each vessel according to their catch history. Second, vessels could
vest their shares in either a cooperative formed by participating members or in a limited
access common pool fishery. Cooperatives are given considerable flexibility as to how catch
entitlements are internally allocated. Leasing arrangements and/or non-arms-length meth-
ods of internal reallocation are all feasible, and some trading between cooperatives is allowed
as well. Vessels that join the limited access fishery vest their shares to a common pool that
• Post-Amendment 80 (2008 and after): 
- Shares of target and prohibited species TACs allocated to 
each vessel 
-  Two options: 
- (i) cooperatives: vest shares into cooperative, with flexibility as 
to how catch entitlements are internally allocated 
- (ii) limited access: vest shares into a common pool that is 
available to all non-cooperative vessels 
- Initially one cooperative formed (Alaska Seafood 
Cooperative): 16 vessels, 7 companies    
- Since 2011, limited access vessels formed the Alaska 
Groundfish Cooperative
The BSAI Non-Pollock Groundfish Fishery
• Also…..Amendment 85 
- NPFMC reallocated the BSAI TAC of cod across sectors 
- Amendment 80 sector received 13.4% of BSAI TAC, considerably 
lower than historical harvest share
Immediate Impacts: Utilization of Halibut 
Allocation
•Observer Data 
- Latitude and longitude of tow 
- Time of tow 
- Duration and depth of tow 
- Total catch 
- Catch composition
Observer Data…..A Deeper Look
•100% coverage for vessels > 124ft pre-2008 
- approximately 40% species composition sampling
•200% coverage for all vessels after 2008 
- approximately 100% species composition sampling
Catch per unit effort 
Share of Total Catch
Halibut: CPUE and Share of Total Catch
Weekly "Bycatch" Share of Total Catch
Weekly "Bycatch" Share of Total Catch
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Figure 5.14: Daily halibut per rock sole - Box-and-whisker plots and kernel-smoothed
densities of daily halibut per rock sole.
all inputs and other outputs constant. As an approximation of this, Figure 5.15 presents
a scatter plot of daily rock sole and halibut catch and the best fitting quadratic function
within a small range of daily fishing duration.25 To account for the di↵erent sampling scheme
before and after A80, I divide daily production and fishing hours by the number of trawls
in a day. The figure clearly displays the very di↵erent subsets of the production set that are
sampled before and after A80, reminiscent of the simulated production sets in Chapter 4.
The fitted quadratic functions suggest that post-A80 production frontiers lie well above those
pre-A80, indicating that considerably more rock sole is caught for a given level of halibut are
A80. While this supports those findings in Figure 5.14, it also indicates that the absolute
production of rock sole increased substantially, despite the lower amounts of halibut caught.
25I omit the range of daily fishing duration to protect the confidentiality of fishermen. The best quadratic
fit was estimated without a constant to be consistent with the idea of null-jointness presented in Chapter 4.
Estimation with a constant produced similar patterns.
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Figure 5.15: Production set in rock sole–halibut space - Sample daily production set
in rock sole–halibut space for a small window of daily trawling hours. Production is divided
by the number of trawls in a day.
5.5 The output distance function
While Figure 5.15 provides some evidence of a shift in the reduced form production fron-
tier, the fitted quadratic functions do not qualify as a bonafide production frontier since the
production of other outputs is not being held constant, nor do they account for other pos-
sible mechanisms such as ine ciency or heterogeneity in fishermen. Thus, a more rigorous
investigation of the transformation function defining the frontier of the PPF is needed. As
previously discussed, a transformation function approach to describing technology su↵ers
from the fact that the transformation function cannot be identified empirically without im-
posing some form of normalization. For this reason, ? and ? found it convenient to work
with a normalized form of the transformation function called the output distance function.
The output distance function represents the distance an output bundle is away from
Changes in Production Possibilities
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Figure 5.18: Relative substitutability (sub) - MLE estimated mean sub between halibut
(b) and rock sole (y) as derived in equation (5.13) for the annual (left) and B&A (right) model.
Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals computed using the delta method.
5.8.3 Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES)
As discussed in Section 5.6.4, MES provides a measure of the curvature of the PPF, quan-
tifying the rate at which MRTby increases as the good to bad ratio (y/b) increases. MES
will take on a negative value if the outputs are substitutes and a positive value if the outputs
are complements. We would thus expect MESby to be positive between rock sole and hal-
ibut. The size of the value is a measure of the strength of the substitute/complementarity
relationship. In particular, values of MESby that are greater in magnitude imply that a
marginal reduction in halibut bycatch will come at a relatively higher opportunity cost.
I estimate MESby for both the annual and B&A models, evaluated at the seasonal mean
(Figure 5.19).48 As expected, MESby is positive—indicating that rock sole and halibut are
48See equation (B.7) in Appendix B.1 for the actual statistic for MESby.




• Pre-A80 “targeting abilities” different from post-A80: 
- Estimated production relationship is a function of 
technology, biology, and behavioral incentives 
- Highlights the difficulty in assessing the potential for cross-
species substitution in fisheries using ex ante data alone 
• Fishermen substantially reduced bycatch of halibut 
under Amendment 80: 
- New incentive structure altered fishing practices 
- Substitution potential was latent until management changes 
altered incentives
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Figure 5.4: Biomass estimates - (left) Stock assessment estimates of biomass. Estimates
for cod, yellowfin sole, and rock sole biomass (left axis) are obtained from NPFMC (2011).
Estimates for halibut biomass (right axis) is obtained from Hare (2011). (right) Percentage
di↵erence in biomass estimates from 2007.
5.3 The rock sole/cod fishery
For reasons discussed above, I limit my analysis to the early season rock sole/cod fishery
(henceforth RS fishery) in the Eastern Bering Sea for the years 2005 to 2010. The RS fishery
is relatively well-defined prior to A80 implementation by the opening season date (January 20
every year), the fishery closing date (Table 5.1), and the fact that the other major subfishery
at this time of year takes place in a distinctly di↵erent geographical region (i.e. the Atka
mackerel fishery in the Aleutian Islands). For the years 2005 to 2007, the RS fishery was
closed prematurely due to a binding halibut TAC, leaving a large portion of the rock sole and
cod TACs unharvested. The end of the RS fishery is not particularly well-defined post-A80
however, since there is no o cial closing of the fishery. To remedy this, I choose a post-A80
